Fair Trade Acts by McLaughlin, James Angell
June, 1938
University of Pennsylvania
Law Review
And American Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
Copyright 1938, by the University of Pennsylvania
VOLUME 86 JUNE, 1938 No. 8
FAIR TRADE ACTS
JAMES ANGELL MCLAUGHLIN t
Fair Trade Acts are new. They arise out of controversies concerning
resale price maintenance which have been heated for more than a quarter
century, and are to be understood partly as a reaction from a peculiar legal
background. This background may be examined as one method of throwing
light on the "mischief to be remedied" by the legislation. A consideration
of the more important characteristics of the case law will be followed by
some suggestions concerning the practical significance of the legislation and
its place in our public policy.
Although a case of resale price maintenance in substantially its modern
form reached the courts at least as early as 1861,1 attempts by vendors to
control the prices at which their vendees may resell are substantially a con-
comitant of mass production and manufacturers' brands covering articles
sold to the consuming public largely on the strength of advertising cam-
paigns transcending state lines and commonly conducted on a nation-wide
basis. Thus, conditions particularly favorable to the development of resale
price maintenance programs did not develop until the last quarter of the last
century. The year before the Sherman Act of 1890,2 however, witnessed
a decision upholding a resale price contract as a reasonable restraint of
trade.3 Although the Sherman Act has been employed as the authority for
I A. B., 1912, University of Michigan; LL. B., 1916, Harvard University, Professor of
Law at Harvard Law School; author of CASES ON THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRuST LAWS (1930)
(1933) and of articles in legal periodicals.
Valuable assistance in the preparation of this article has been rendered by Messrs.
John Carbine, John O'Hara and Stanley I. Posner, members of the Third-year Class at Har-
vard Law School. Various ideas herein contained were suggested by a joint report submit-
ted by them as a course requirement. This they have supplemented by further investigation.
i. New York Ice Co. v. Parker, 21 How. Pr. 302 (N. Y. 1861).
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), is U. S. C. A. § i (1927).
3. Fowle v. Park, 131 U. S. 88 (i889). In Wampole & Co. v. Kam Co., I I Ont. L. R.
61g, 627, 628 (i9o6) an action for damages and an injunction brought by the manufacturer
of a proprietary medicine to enforce resale price maintenance contracts was dismissed on the
ground that the contracts were contrary to the Canadian anti-trust laws. (CRIm. CODE §§ 516,
(803)
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outlawing such contracts, substantially undivided credit for discovering their
illegality seems due to Judge (later Mr. Justice) Lurton, sitting on the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 19o7.4 Hartman, the proprietor of
"Peruna" (a so-called medicine having exhilarating qualities reputed to be
not altogether disassociated from alcohol), procured an injunction against
Park & Sons, a prominent cut rate drug distributing corporation, upon
allegations that the plaintiff distributed Peruna only through dealers who
would contract to maintain resale prices and that defendant was procuring
Peruna for sale at cut prices by fraud and by inducing some of plaintiff's
authorized distributors to break their contracts with plaintiff. Judge Lurton
delivered the opinion of an unanimous three judge court ordering the
injunction dissolved.
An interesting scent crosses the trail here without requiring a lengthy
digression. Eleven years earlier, Judge Lurton had announced from the
same bench the doctrine of the famous Button Fastener case,5 which had
52o.) The plaintiffs' manager testified that he was persuaded to establish a system of con-
tracts by a committee of the Retail Druggists Association as a part of a plan to organize the
distribution of proprietary medicines in Canada on a basis to eliminate price cutting. The
court said:
"This agreement is used not simply in relation to these commodities between the
plaintiffs and their various customers but is the form adopted by the committees repre-
senting a large part of the wholesale and retail trade of Canada. It means that nearly
every commodity in common use is to be subject to a hard and fixed contract which fixes
the manufacturer's price, the wholesale price, and the retail price, below which none can
sell and no one can purchase who is not a member of the association and agrees to sign
the contract in question. It means that competition is not only unduly prevented or
lessened in the purchase, barter, and sale of this article but is absolutely destroyed. In
the present case the evidence also shewed, I think, that the price was unreasonably en-
hanced by reason of this agreement ...
"A number of American cases were also cited on behalf of the plaintiffs: Garst v.
Harris, 177 Mass. 72; Walsh v. Dwight, 92 N. Y. State Rep. 9r; Whitwell v. Continental
Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. Rep. 454; Hulse v. Bonsack Machine Co., 65 Fed. Rep. 864, 869;
Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Amunition Co., (1894) A. C. 535. These cases
are decisions where there is no law corresponding to our statute, and therefore can aid
very little in a decision of the present case.
"I think the statute was intended to provide against agreements similar to the one
in question. . . .
"I find as a fact from the evidence that the agreements in question and each of them
were procured by an urilawful conspiracy between the plaintiffs, defendants and other
manufacturing chemists and the Association of Wholesale and Retail Druggists, and that
the conspiracy was entered into for the purpose of unduly preventing or lessening com-
petition in the purchase, barter and sale of the articles in question being articles of trade
and commerce and for the purpose of unreasonably enhancing the prices of said com-
modities and are contrary to the provisions of the Criminal Code and are null and void."
No such comprehensive conspiracy was in evidence in the Hartman case, 153 Fed. 24 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1907). Cf. Straus v. American Publishers' Ass'n, i77 N. Y. 473 (904).
Suggestions of the illegality of resale price maintenance elsewhere have been attributed
only to Norway and the Argentine. Copeland, Resale Price Maintenance (934) 13 ENcYc.
Soc. ScL 326, 327. But the Norwegian doctrine seems directed at the maintenance of unrea-
sonable prices in general rather than specifically at resale price maintenance, and, while the
practice is said to be unlawful in the Argentine, it is prevalent there. See Kosicki, Exchsive
Sales Agreements in Foreign Trade, U. S. Bur. of For. & Dom. Com., Trade Promotion Ser.
No. 45 (,927) 47.
4. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, i53 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 6th, i9o7).
5. Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1896).
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the effect of permitting a patentee to exercise monopolistic influence on the
markets for unpatented supplies used in connection with his invention. The
commercial possibilities of this doctrine were developed with increasing
assiduity and with increasing lack of restraint in restraining trade. (The
greatest exploitation awaited the Supreme Court's blessing on the doctrine
in I912.6 This in turn led to such intolerable ingenuity and greed on the
part of patentees that the doctrine was abolished by a frank volte face in
1917.7) Returning to the intersection of this byway with our main trail in
Judge Lurton's court in 1907, we can understand why we find counsel much
concerned with the question whether the proprietor of a medicine made by
secret process may stand on the same ground as a patentee with reference to
monopoly or restraint of trade. The judge became so interested in develop-
ing a distinction to the detriment of the proprietor of the secret process that
his much more significant discovery of the illegality of resale price mainte-
nance programs was reduced to the proportions of an epilogue. In transition
he cited Coke to the effect that a condition in restraint of alienation could
not be made to run with a chattel. 8 * He did not stop to analyze the differ-
ence between a condition, which would disenable the vendee from selling as
a matter of property law, and a contract, which the vendee would have legal
power to break. Nor did he pause to remark that Lord Coke hardly fancied
himself as a chancellor.9 Long before any comprehensive theory of
equitable servitudes on chattels had been developed, 10 the doctrines flowing
from Judge Lurton's opinion had rendered the discussion academic with
reference to resale price maintenance, at least in the federal courts.
Upon the central question he said in part:
"The plain effect of the 'systems of contracts', the purposed relation
of each to every other being confessed by the very description of the
method of carrying on business stated in the bill, is, first, to destroy all
competition between jobbers or wholesale dealers in selling complain-
ant's preparations. . .. Next, all competition between retailers is
destroyed .... Thus a combination between the manufacturer, the
wholesalers, and the retailers to maintain prices and stifle competition
has been brought about. It is true that the complainant is not in com-
petition with other makers of 'Peruna'. There are no others. If there
were, there would not be a complete or general restraint." ".
He then suggested the illegality of a monopolization of lumber, furni-
ture or stoves. Counsel for plaintiff apparently did not impress upon him
6. Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U. S. I (1912).
7. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502 (917).
8. 153 Fed. 24, 39 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907).
9. 2 CAMPBELL, LIVEs OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS (7th ed. 1878) 386-9o; I CHAFEE AND
SIMPsoN, CASES ON EQUITY (934) 36.
IO. See Chafee, Equitable Seritudes on Chattels (1928) 41 HARV. L. REV. 945.
11. 153 Fed. 24, 42 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907).
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the argument, not perhaps acceptable to their client, that there was really
nothing generically distinctive about Peruna and that it was in adequate
competition with other means of exhilaration; for the judge instead returns
to strike one more blow at the argument that articles made under a secret
process are favored wards of the law. He was doubtless aided in reaching
his conclusion by the fact that he had, within the year, decided against the
wall paper trust a case in which resale price maintenance was a minor inci-
dent of a comprehensive combination between manufacturers, reinforced by
exclusive dealing contracts with all jobbers exacted under threat of boycott.
As the judge said:
"A more complete monopoly in an article of universal use has prob-
ably never been brought about. . . . None of the shifts resorted to
for suppressing freedom of commerce and securing undue prices, shown
by the reported cases, is half so complete in its details." 12
Such a sweeping condemnation naturally did not induce a separate
consideration of resale price incidents. The bad company in which the
judge had last seen a resale price system, however, may have been influential
in forming his estimate of its character when it was haled separately before
his court in its own proper person.
The leading Supreme Court case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park &
Sons Co.' 3 adds little but authority and prestige to the doctrine of the
Hartman case. Another patent medicine proprietor sued the same defendant
upon a similar theory and was confounded with similar reasoning. The case
was complicated by the fact that the plaintiff was making his authorized
wholesalers agents and not purchasers. As a much later decision of the
Supreme Court unequivocally established,14 no problem of resale price main-
tenance is involved unless there is a resale; and if a manufacturer makes his
distributors real agents, he may with impunity fix the prices at which they
sell on his behalf. The court avoided this difficulty by a very strict con-
struction of the bill of complaint, which was open to the argument that the
plaintiff was endeavoring to control goods in the hands of his wholesale
distributors, including goods which had arrived there through indirect
channels so as to be free from the restraint of the plaintiff's contracts.' 5
This judicial manceuver evoked some rather cutting language from Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes, whose objections were not confined to that point.' 6 Returning
from this last digression to the main stream of doctrine, we find Mr. Justice
Hughes following the pattern already outlined in the Hartman case, with
12. Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co., 148 Fed. 939, 947 (C. C. A. 6th,
i9o6).
13. 220 U. S. 373 (I91i).
14. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476 (1926).
I5. 220 U. S. 373, 397-98 (1911).
i6. Id. at 397-98.
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a somewhat more balanced treatment of the points involved. He had much
less difficulty in establishing the elementary proposition that the proprietor
of a "patent" medicine does not have the powers of a patentee. But the
concept of restraint of trade is again introduced through a quotation from
Coke, assigning it as a reason for the invalidity of conditions annexed to
the title of chattels.17  The similar failure of this court to differentiate
clearly between conditions and contracts has led some students to think that
confusion on that point is an important element in explaining the decision.
A less stultifying construction of the opinion is to be preferred, however.
Systems of resale price maintenance contracts are void as in restraint of
trade because they eliminate competition between distributors. The Su-
preme Court, which had affirmed Judge Lurton in the Wall Paper case in
19o9,18 was probably also influenced in 1911 by similar associations with
that case. The systematic element in the resale price maintenance programs
may have been important in both cases. As recently as 19o8, the Supreme
Court had occasion to explain that a system of contracts throughout a line
of commerce might constitute an unlawful restraint of trade 19 in situations
where a single such contract would be lawful.
20
The decision of the Supreme Court upholding a resale price mainte-
nance contract as a reasonable restraint of trade in 1889 21 might be ex-
plained by the intervention of the Sherman Act upon the theory that the
statute departed from the common-law standard of reasonable restraint of
trade. But the Standard Oil opinion 22 repudiating that theory was handed
down only six weeks after the Miles case. The primary distinction which
Judge Lurton had so painstakingly developed as the basis for his decision in
the Hartman case was also shortly swept away. In Bauer & Cie. v. O'Doz-
nell,23 the Supreme Court decided that even a patentee could not control re-
sale prices. Thus, technically, nearly everything about the Hartnwn case was
wrong, but the result stood re~nforced. The Button Fastener case turned
out ultimately to be wrong, the distinction between patented articles and
proprietary medicines turned out to be misleading, and the basic theory of
construction of the Sherman Act on which the Hartan case might have
rested was renounced by the court that had proclaimed it with vehemence;
but nothing impaired the conclusion (i) that a resale price maintenance
program was a violation of the Sherman Act when it eliminated competition
17. Id. at 404.
18. Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co., 212 U. S. 227 (199o).
ig. Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 2o9 U. S. 423 (19o8).
2o. Cf. Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U. S. 179 (19o6).
21. Fowle v. Park, 131 U. S: 88 (1889). See supra note 3.
22. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
23. 229 U. S. I (1913). The Bauer case itself covered only attempted control of price
by notice affixed to the chattel, but control by an elaborate system purporting to give pur-
chasers the status of licensees only was declared ineffectual in Straus v. Victor Talking
Mach. Co., 243 U. S. 49o (1917). A system of formal contracts was then obviously doomed.
Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U. S. 8 (1918).
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between distributors in interstate trade or (2) that it was unenforceable at
common law when it achieved a like result in local trade.
Biological experience would indicate that any doctrine surviving amid
such destruction would have an opportunity to thrive. Indeed, a large part
of the uprooting had taken place only with reference to doctrines tending
to limit the growth of the Hartman case. In the early 192O'S, a new process
of elimination tended further to increase government activity with reference
to resale price maintenance. The activities of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, formed in 1914,24 met sweeping challenges in court after the War.
A series of decisions, commencing with Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz
in 1920,25 restricted the activities of the Commission, with reference both
to substantive law and to procedure. Of the first nine cases involving the
Commission that were reviewed by the Supreme Court, seven were decided
against the Commission,26 leaving only two branches of its work com-
paratively unchallenegd: first, the pursuit of false advertising and mis-
branding; 27 and second, the campaign against resale price maintenance.
28
Before reviewing the Commission's activities in this last respect, how-
ever, it is necessary to examine a legal curiosity. United States v. Colgate
& Co.29 is a caricature illustrating the unreality that can be achieved through
an accumulation of procedural technicalities. In the first place, the case
arose upon indictments. Indictments, as is well known, are subject to strict
construction out of consideration for the accused-a consideration which
may be said to be frequently misplaced or at least fostered with unnecessary
solicitude. In any event, not facts but allegations count in an indictment.
The greatest artificiality in the Colgate case arose, however, by reason of a
point of appellate procedure. The case went direct from a district court
to the Supreme Court under a statute authorizing such direct appellate juris-
diction upon writs of error "from a decision . . . sustaining a demurrer
24. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §4I (1927).
25. 253 U. S. 421 (1920).
26. Federal Trade Comm. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (192o) ; Federal Trade Comm. v. Cur-
tis Publishing Co., 26o U. S. 568 (1923) ; Federal Trade Comm. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261
U. S. 463 (1923) ; Federal Trade Comm. v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U. S. 565 (1924) ;
Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924) ; Federal Trade Comm.
v. Hammond, Snyder & Co., 267 U. S. 586 (1925); Federal Trade Comm. v. Western Meat
Co., 272 U. S. 554 (1926).
An alternative method of counting would raise the number of reversals to fifteen, because
three other cases were decided with the Sinclair case, another with the American Tobacco
case and two more each with the Hammond, Snyder and Western Meat cases.
Up to the time of the Western Meat case in 1926 certiorari had also been denied in eight
cases, confirming six orders adverse to the Commission and two orders favorable to it. Cer-
tiorari from a favorable order had also been dismissed without prejudice in a resale price
maintenance case upon the assumption that the controversy would be disposed of pursuant to
the ruling in the Beech-Nut case. In a tenth case certiorari from an adverse order was dis-
missed on stipulation. This information does not seem of sufficient importance to warrant
citation of the authorities.
27. Federal Trade Comm. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U. S. 483 (1922).
28. Federal Trade Comm. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441 (1922).
29. 250 U. S. 300 (1919).
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to any indictment . . . where such decision . . . is based upon the
. construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded".30
The Supreme Court had previously held that the sole question for its con-
sideration upon such a writ of error was the construction of the statute.
It was an established corollary to this proposition that the court might not
construe the indictment. Accordingly, it was bound to accept the construc-
tion put upon the indictment by the district court. An almost unavoidable
inference in the Colgate case is that the district judge was unsympathetic
to the application of the Sherman Act there proposed. There is further
reason to suppose that he was no master of English and was careless in his
treatment of the particular case. He first overruled the original indictment,
assigning, among other reasons, that it did not allege resale price mainte-
nance contracts. An amended indictment specifically setting up certain such
contracts was overruled "for the same reasons".31 His "construction" of
the indictment thus flatly contradicted the face of the indictment; but under
the rules which the Supreme Court had laid out for itself, the Supreme
Court was not permitted to look at the indictment to see what it did actually
say. The district judge's opinion was, furthermore, largely self-contra-
dictory. The Supreme Court then addressed itself to the task of deter-
mining which of the district court's conflicting statements it would accept
as the district court's construction of the indictment. Mr. Justice McRey-
nolds (whose exceptional zeal to enforce the Sherman Act has been con-
spicuously inoperative in resale price maintenance cases), after one of his
rare expressions of doubt, elected to stand on a passage in the district
judge's opinion which stated that the indictment alleged only that Colgate
& Company was refusing to sell its goods to price cutters and, conse-
quently, upheld the decision that the indictment was insufficient. He, ap-
parently, also took a leaf from Mr. Justice Holmes' book. The senior
justice had consistently stood out for the privilege of the owner of property
to dispose of it on his own terms, whether the effect be to eliminate competi-
tion between distributors or to give a patentee monopolistic powers over
unpatenied materials. Thus, he consistently voted in favor of the legality
of resale price maintenance programs 32 and in favor of the doctrine of the
Button Fastener case.33 Apart from assertions that he simply could not see
the opposing point of view, his chief argument was that what one
30. 34 STAT. 1246 (z907), 18 U. S. C. A. § 682 (1927) ; see United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U. S. 300, 301.
31. See U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1918, No. 828, Transcr. of Rec. 5, 13, 15-17, 21, 24,
Cases & Points, 250 U. S. Vol. 36; Dunn, Resale Price Maintenance (1923) 32 YALE L. J.
676, 687-88.
32. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 409 (911) ; United States
v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 (i919) ; United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85,
10 (ig2o) ; Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S. 208 (1921) ; Federal Trade
Comm. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, 456 (1922).
33. See Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U. S. i, 49 (1912) ; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Uni-
versal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 519 (917).
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may refuse to do absolutely he may refuse to do conditionally. 4 This
argument is submitted to be transparently unsound. I may refuse abso-
lutely to give A five dollars; but if I gave him five dollars as an inducement
to murder X, I may get into trouble. As the vice of price maintenance is
elimination of competition between dealers, the choice of the sanction of
refusal to sell should not be conclusive of immunity. In any event, out of
the strange procedural wilderness in the Colgate case emerged the uncouth
doctrine of a supposed unqualified privilege of refusal to sell.
The case inevitably caused trouble to the district courts. Apparently
no judge and no counsel having occasion to litigate resale price maintenance
cases realized how remote the Supreme Court's decision was from the facts
of the Colgate Company's program. The decision merely stood for an
unsound abstraction based upon the Supreme Court's questionable construc-
tion of the district court's ambiguous misconstruction of the district attor-
ney's technical reconstruction of the facts. One district judge thought the
Dr. Miles case was overruled; 35 and another court, while confessing in-
ability to make any rational reconciliation, hazarded a decision that a tacit
understanding to maintain prices could be upheld as an exercise of a manu-
facturer's privilege of refusal to sell, while a written agreement to like effect
would be unlawful.30 Three cases were decided in the lower federal courts
after the Colgate case and before the Beech-Nut case reached the Supreme
Court,3 7 and three times the Supreme Court had occasion to announce that
the Colgate case had been "misapprehended". 88
The Beech-Nut case 3 9 upheld a Federal Trade Commission order
against a resale price maintenance program substantially similar to that
followed by Colgate & Co., holding it to be a violation of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act concerning unfair methods of competition. 40
Mr. Justice Holmes, continuing to support price maintenance, dissented
with the remark that he did not see what could be possibly unfair in the
program. 41  But the Supreme Court had already indicated that unfair
methods of competition included those "heretofore regarded as against public
34. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 519
(917) ; Federal Trade Comm. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, 457 (1922).
35. Westenhaver, D. J., in United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 264 Fed. 175, 179-186
(N. D. Ohio, 1919).
36. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 264 Fed. 885 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920).
Cf. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Frey & Son, Inc., 261 Fed. 65, 67 (C. C. A. 4th, 1919).
37. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Frey & Son, Inc., 261 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 4th, 1919) ; United
States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 264 Fed. 175 (N. D. Ohio, 1919) ; Beech-Nut Packing Co. v.
Federal Trade Comm., 264 Fed. 885 (C. C. A. 2d, 192o).
38. See United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85, 99 (1920); Frey & Son,
Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S. 208, 210 (1921) ; Federal Trade Comm. v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, 451, 452 (1922).
39. Federal Trade Comm. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441 (1922).
40. 38 STAT. 717, 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 45 (1927).
41. Federal Trade Comm. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, 456 (1922).
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policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition". 42
A resale price maintenance program unquestionably hinders competition.
The announced doctrine of the Miles case indicates that such hindrance may
easily be legally undue. Moreover there is no merit in the suggestion that
the Commission has no mandate to enforce the Sherman Act, for a viola-
tion may be regarded as an unfair method of competition against others who
observe the law.
Not only did resale price maintenance afford the occasion for one of
the Federal Trade Commission's few successes. It also proved to be a
stumbling block for the Department of Justice. Four proceedings com-
menced after the decision of the Beech-Nut case in the Supreme Court were
dismissed.48 With the exception of one consent decree where the practice
was only incidentally involved, 44 the only success of the Department was a
consent decree against Schrader's Son, Inc., obtained while the Government
was prosecuting criminal proceedings in the district court subsequent to the
Supreme Court's sustaining an indictment against that concern.45 With the
exception of one very successful damage suit by the arch enemy of resale
price maintenance,46 the law gave rise to no bounteous harvest through triple
damage suits. The mild and tardy preventative process of the Federal
Trade Commission was, however, invoked with a frequency and with a
degree of success which constituted a constant source of irritation to those
who think of price cutters as anti-social characters.
As the foregoing discussion may suggest, there is still some difficulty
in determining the bounds of the Colgate case. The Beech-Nut system
involved active circularization of the trade, requesting members to report
price cutters and giving assurance of protection against them. This cir-
cularization was supplemented by personal activity on the part of missionary
men, whose mission was to promote the company's sales and its incidental
policies such as price maintenance. The only action taken against price
cutters was an exercise of the supposed right of refusal to sell, supple-
mented, of course, by threats to exercise the right, and qualified by resupply
of offenders who gave suitable assurances of future compliance. The com-
pany employed such obvious incidents of modern efficient practice as serial
numbers on its products and a card catalogue of price cutters. Some opinion
was inclined to the view that the Beech-Nut case prohibited the incidents of
42. Federal Trade Comm. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427 (1920).
43. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476 (1926) ; United States v. Hud-
nut, 8 F. (2d) ioo (S. D. N. Y. 1925) ; United States v. Colgate & Co., FmD. ANTI-TRUST
LAWS (1938) 207 (D. N. J. 1925); United States v. One-Piece Bifocal Lens Co., FmE. ANTI-
TRUST LAvs (1938) 21o (D. Ind. 1927) (dismissed on stipulation).
44. United States v. Confectioners' Club of Baltimore, FED. ANTI-TRUST LAws (1938)
232 (D. Md. i93o).
45. United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., Fan. ANTI-TRuST LAvs (1938) 192 (E. D.
N. Y. 1923).
46. Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 297 Fed. 791 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
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business efficiency while leaving the substance of control of supply intact if
the privilege of refusal to sell were exercised with sufficient lack of system.
A less stultifying interpretation has basis in the Beech-Nut opinion itself,
as well as in the subsequent orders of the Federal Trade Commission, and
subsequent opinions of circuit courts of appeals which kept the orders in
bounds. The vice of the Beech-Nut system was a combination or a con-
spiracy between the manufacturer and his distributors to keep up dis-
tributors' prices in violation of the Sherman Act. A combination or con-
spiracy is more readily to be inferred in cases of active "cooperation" be-
tween the manufacturer and the distributors. As long as the questionable
doctrine stands that one may exercise his privilege of refusal to sell in order
to promote the anti-social practice of eliminating competition between dis-
tributors, a manufacturer may unquestionably so act upon such information
as comes to him in the ordinary course of business. If he takes active steps
and goes out of his way to procure information, he begins to approach the
orbit of the Beech-Nut case. Particularly if he stimulates distributor action
to this end, he is likely to find that his supposedly unqualified privilege is no
answer to a charge of combination and conspiracy predicated upon the quest
for information to make the privilege effectual.
47
The foregoing analysis is not set forth as the clearest and most per-
suasive exposition of the federal law antedating the Miller-Tydings Act.
It is designed rather to show the peculiarities, uncertainties and exasperat-
ing aspects of that law as constituting a material part of the background of
the so-called Fair Trade Acts. Business fact and economic theory have so
far been ignored except where some minimal references to them have been
unavoidable. The economic issues, many times mooted, remain most inter-
esting. A primary source of heated discussion has been the dual character
of price cutting; for even though most wise men find the world composed
of more blended grays than blacks and whites, two kinds of price cutting
emerge with a degree of clarity. They may be described with some plausi-,
bility in simplest terms as good price cutting and bad. Price cutting based
upon superior efficiency is essential to the ideal of our economic system.
Business may not approximate the ideal, but a very large portion of our
distribution is conducted on a competitive price basis. Claims that our
economic system is defunct and must be superseded by something radically
different, such as planned economy or regulated monopoly, present more
plausibility in certain fields of production. The monster of oligopoly does
not stand in the center of the picture for those who promote the Fair Trade
Acts. The small distributor interests complain of the economic power of
the chain distributors, but they do not complain of lack of competition.
47. Federal Trade Commission cases to 1933 are classified in McLAUGHLIN, CASES ON
THE FEDRnAI ANTI-TRuST LAWS (1933) 487-504, especially n. 141.
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The complaint is of excessive competition or of unfair competition. Sher-
man Act theory, as well as much contemporary activity, consists with the
classical idea of the survival of the fit. The business man is to be encour-
aged to attract trade by economies of operation and by passing on his
economies to the consumer. The consumer is entitled to object when those
who ought to be competing for his favor by endeavoring to give him more
for his money divert their energies into "cooperation" with a view to
furthering group distributor interests at the expense of others. Even the
distributor should recognize that he, himself, is a consumer, and that in the
long run the net result of such cooperative effort must be wasteful. Ag-
gressive cooperation in one stage of economy raises pressure for defensive
combinations in other stages. Ultimately too much energy is lost in con-
flicting schemes, and too few people are concentrating upon the job of
improving economic efficiency.
The rugged individualism of the "independent" retailer is, in some
aspects, a rather pitiful joke. He wishes to hide in the pack and be pro-
tected by "cooperation" from bearing the risks which would afford any
economic justification for profits. Any scheme which would effectually
prevent the cash and carry consumer from buying at a cheaper price than
the consumer who gets elaborate delivery and other service plus costly
credit is a vicious scheme. Any program which endeavors to use group
action to restrain price competition based upon efficiency requires a showing
of exceptional circumstances to warrant a hearing.
But even as price cutting based on efficiency may be clad in effulgent
white and extolled as the fairest handmaiden of our economic system, so
may "loss leader" price cutting be clothed in somberest sable and condemned
as among the most evil of ogres. A manufacturer, at great expense and
by patiently pursuing a consistent policy over a period of years, develops
a widely known product under a distinctive name or trade-mark. He pro-
motes the demand for his product by a costly advertising campaign directed
toward a cumulative "build-up" of associations in the minds of ultimate
consumers. Uniform name, uniform appearance, uniform quality and uni-
form price, under ideal conditions, can produce a single complex in the
consumer's mind which is most advantageous. If he likes a product, he
buys it when he will and can, and doesn't think of questioning the price.
At one time a "dollar watch" definitely indicated the watch of a single
manufacturer in the minds of so many people that the price became the
most important part of the complex. Any ignorant or unthinking person
could assure you with confidence that it was a contradiction in terms and,
hence, an absurdity to think that a dollar watch was only worth ninety-five
cents. In such a case, if some retailer, acquiring such watches at the estab-
lished trade price of seventy-five cents, honestly believes that he can make
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more money be selling some at eighty-nine cents, it is possible to understand
how the manufacturer may get excited. The magic combination is broken.
Furthermore, the dealer is really not selling watches chiefly on the strength
of his own efficiency. The watches are sold on the strength of years of the
manufacturer's advertising. The mere shock of having a dollar watch
offered for eighty-nine cents would be sufficient to tempt bargain hunters
suddenly to discover that they needed a watch after all. But the worst is
yet to come. Another retailer, seeing the rush for the eighty-nine cent
watches, sees a chance to show up the other price cutter as a mere "piker".
He buys watches for seventy-five cents and sells them for sixty-nine cents,
announcing that he is able to do so by reason of his shrewd buying and by
reason of the ecraordinary merchandising efficiency which pervades his
entire establishment. The loss of six cents plus handling costs is cheap
advertising for him as long as the game works. Some of his competitors
may try taking six-cent losses for a while until everybody gets tired; and
then, for some reason, a customer with a dollar in his hand may have hard
work finding one of those watches for sale in the neighborhood at any
price. The price cutter has been guilty of fraud, deception, theft of good-
will, sabotage and general "orneriness", resulting in the destruction of an
immeasurable amount of goodwill for the product. It would appear that
there is a net social loss, but the price cutter doesn't worry. If there is any
gain, he has obtained it; the losses have been suffered by others. The manu-
facturer said the watch was worth a dollar, and he cannot bear to see the
truth he has spoken twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools. 48
The foregoing is, of course, oversimplified as well as overdramatized.
The picture is both incomplete and insufficiently qualified. The price cutting
is likely to grow through more stages. Even if the manufacturer is not so
directly concerned with the consumer's complex, he often finds that in-
creasing price cutting by retailers gives rise to pressure by reluctant re-
tailers upon wholesalers to lower wholesale prices to enable retailers to meet
the cuts of competitors. The wholesalers then come back upon the manu-
facturer for greater quantity or functional discounts to enable them to
continue handling the goods. In any event, "loss leader" selling is hard to
justify in theory. Defense of a legal system which would leave the propri-
etor of a brand helpless to oppose it may follow the line of minimizing the
extent of such abuses in fact, or it may accept such abuses as inevitable inci-
48. Messrs. Holmes, Ingersoll and Kipling have all contributed to this suggestion. "I
cannot believe that in the long run the public will profit by this court permitting knaves to
cut reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their own and thus to impair, if not
to destroy, the production and sale of articles which it is assumed to be desirable that the
public should be able to get." Per Holmes, J., in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U. S. 373, 412 (1911). Cf. Ingersoll v. Goldstein, 84 N. J. Eq. 445, 93 Atl. 193 (1915) ;
Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne & Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 222, Ioi Atl. 1O3O (i9I7), 89 N. J. Eq. 332,
io8 Atl. 128 (1918); N. J. Laws I916, c. 1O7, amending, N. J. Laws 1913, c. 2io, as amended
by, N. J. Laws 1915, c. 376; Kipling, If.
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dents to the establishment and promotion of the paramount public policy in
favor of desirable price cutting.
The very first step to take toward the formulation of a sound public
policy seems obvious: explore the possibilities of differentiating between
good price cutting and bad. The astonishing part of the whole spectacle is
that, practically speaking, the obvious beginning has never been made.
The reaction from the strict anti-trust law against resale price mainte-
nance was unceasing agitation by distributor groups for statutory change in
the law. One of the ablest early economic studies of resale price mainte-
nance discussed public policy upon the assumption that manufacturers were
endeavoring to impose their will upon the distributing trade,4 9 and the same
assumption has underlain a large part of the discussion of judges and
lawyers. The most distinctive feature of the price maintenance movement
of the 193o's, however, has been distributor initiative. It now appears that
most manufacturers are comparatively inert. Many of them may, better
than most independent distributors, realize how complex the problem is even
when reduced to its simplest terms. The manufacturer may have diverse
channels of distribution, and he is not clear with whom his interest lies.
For reasons which it is manifestly beyond the scope of this paper adequately
to explore, organizations of "independent" distributors have had increasing
voice in government in recent years. The rise of the chains and mass dis-
tribution, in general, has aroused defensive aggressiveness on their part.
New Deal disparagement of "big business" has been a favorable factor.
While the N. R. A. fiasco to some extent discredited business "cooperation",
some organizations had their eyes opened to the commercial possibilities of
regimented business promoting its interests at the expense of the consumer.
At all events, with the exception of the ex-soldiers, "independent" dis-
tributor groups seem to have more political potency to procure an overvalua-
tion of their supposed interests than any other contemporary group.
The federal law against resale price maintenance was not doomed to
be demolished by a frontal attack, however. A flanking movement through
the state legislatures proved to be much more effective. A California
Statute of 193I, 5 0 with extended sanctions added by amendment in 1933, 51
was made the basis of a rapid and sweeping campaign through the states.
Several states enacted it with the reproduction of a typographical error
which rendered one passage altogether unintelligible.52  Early in 1937, the
49. "Think of the country's million or more retailers, together with all its wholesalers
and jobbers, bound up by such adamantine requirements, free to do nothing but act as pup-
pets to the infallible oligarchy above them !" See MuRCHiSON, RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
(1919) 126.
5o. Cal. Stat. 1931, c. 278.
5I. Cal. Stat. 1933, c. 260.
52. N. J. Laws 1935, 140, § I (b) ; Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard, 191 Atl. 873 (N. J.
1937). This statute appears in approved and amended form in N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) tit.
56:4-5, §1 (b), without indicating the authority for the change. Cf. Cal. Stat. ig3i, c.
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Druggists' Association presented an improved and elaborate draft, which
was thenceforth faithfully followed, some legislatures going to the trouble
promptly thus to bring their 1935 service up to date.53  This movement
encountered no serious opposition or detailed theoretical criticism. Litiga-
tion and theoretical discussions in legal periodicals centered around its con-
stitutionality, particularly after different state courts of appeal took con-
flicting views.54 When the United States Supreme Court upheld the Illinois
and California Acts,55 the rout of the previous policy was virtually com-
plete.sa The laggard legislatures climbed on the band wagon until forty-three
acceded, 56 and Congress adopted and the President (reluctantly, it is said)
signed the Miller Tydings Act,57 exempting from the Sherman Act resale
price maintenance contracts lawful in the state where the resale is to be made.
In no event does resale price maintenance threaten to assume a major
place with reference to the entire volume of retail trade in this country. In
the first place it applies only to branded articles and, while legal encourage-
ment of price maintenance movements may tend toward promoting manu-
facturers' brands to some extent, a large portion of merchandise may be
safely excluded at the threshold. Direct distribution from producer to con-
sumer is not involved, the bulk of the mail order business being thus ex-
cluded. Price maintenance affords excellent sales arguments for private
brands, such as those so vigorously developed by Macy and Co. 58  Since
278; Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U. S. 198, 200 (1936). This error has quite recently
been corrected in N. Y. Laws 1938, c. 14, Print 558, approved Feb. lO, 1938, 105 C. C. H.
Trade Reg. Serv. 2924 (1938).
53. See Wolff (937) 4 TRADE REG. REv. 5; Md. Laws 1937, c. 239, repealing Md. Laws
1935, c. 212; Ore. Laws 1937, c. 113, amending Ore. Laws 1935, C. 295. For a detailed com-
parison of the two Acts in parallel columns see Merrell and Kittelle, Analysis of State Fair
Trade Laws (Oct. 1937) DuN's REviEw 8.
54. The constitutionality of the Fair Trade Acts is considered in Notes (1936) 34 MIcH.
L. REV. 691, 22 VA. L. REV. 556, (937) 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 271.
"Judicial acquiescence in a broad legislative discretion to foster one economic group as
against another" is clearly portrayed in Legis. (1937) 22 IowA L. REV. 736, 758.
The constitutionality of the Miller-Tydings Amendment is adequately discussed in Legis.
(1937) 51 HARv. L. REV. 336.
The legislative history of the Fair Trade Acts is developed in Legis. (1936) 36 Cor. L.
REV. 293, 49 HARv. L. REV. 811.
For an extensive review of the case background see Laurent (1937) 12 Wis. L. REv. 226;
Note (i937) 21 MARQ. L. REV. 88.
55. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936);
Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U. S. 198 (1936).
55a. The New York Court of Appeals which had held the state act violative of both
federal and state constitutions, Doubleday-Doran & Co. v. Macy & Co., 269 N. Y. 272, 199
N. E. 409 (1935), reversed itself with reference to both constitutions. Bourjois Sales Corp.
v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. .(2d) 30 (937). Accord: Johnson & Johnson v. Weiss-
bard, 121 N. J. Eq. 585, 191 At1. 873 (1937), reversing 12o N. J. Eq. 314, 184 Atl. 783 (1936).
56. According to the latest information available, forty-three states have now fallen in
line. The last was Mississippi. Miss. Laws 1938, Sen. Bill No. i88, effective Apr. 7, 1938.
105 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. (1938) f12892. Territory not yet whipped in line comprises
Alabama, Delaware, Missouri, Texas, Vermont and the District of Columbia. Io6 C. C. H.
Trade Reg. Serv. (,938) ff 564.
57. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. A. § i (Supp. 1937).
58. See Walker, Expose of Fair Trade Laws, an Address before Nat. Ass'n of Market-
ing Teachers, Dec. 1936.
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distributing chains are usually hostile to price maintenance, insuperable
obstacles are likely to be encountered in establishing the practice in lines
where chains are strongest. Private brands are, of course, one of the main
weapons of the chains in promoting their merchandising policies. The
fields where the manufacturers have arranged to retain title to the goods
through distribution completed by their legal agents represent areas presently
outside the scope of the Fair Trade Acts. Such a method of distribution
seems to have shown its practicability with reference to automobiles and
electrical equipment. In addition to the elementary limits of resale price
maintenance doctrines and in addition to the difficulties of initiating pro-
grams in various lines, much importance must be attached to difficulties of
enforcing compliance. In spite of the high degree of control exercised by
manufacturers of the distribution of automobiles, it is common knowledge
that active price competition is maintained by retailers through the device
of making liberal to extravagant allowances for the "trade-in" value of
used cars. A similar situation is said to exist with reference to radios, 59
vacuum cleaners and like equipment. A legal periodical is not the most
obvious place to attempt a discussion in detail of the practical characteristics
of various lines of business. That has been well done elsewhere. 60  Busi-
ness school periodicals and trade journals will doubtless develop informa-
tion much more complete than any now available. An estimate that Fair
Trade Acts will not effect more than ten per cent of retail trade and perhaps
not more than five per cent seems consistent with the information presently
available. 61
The generally accepted facts that the Fair Trade Acts have been largely
promoted by associations of druggists and that the drug trade has been
exceptionally successful in availing itself of the Acts 62 may well invite
speculation concerning the causes for this exceptional success. It is some-
times suggested that the druggists are more readily organized than dis-
59. See infra note 69.
6o. SELIGMAN AND LOv, PRICE MAINTENANCE AND PRICE CUTTING (1932) App. II;
Grether, Resale Price Maintenance in Great Britain (1935) 2 UNIv. CALIF. PUB. IN EcoN.
332; Wolff (1937) 5 TRADE REG. REv. 2-3; 6 id. 2-19; 7 id. 2-14.
61. Wolff (1937) 7 TRADE REG. REV. 6.
62. Walker, supra note 58, at 2-9; Grether, Legislation Restricting Price Cutting (1936)
24 CALIF. L. REV. 640, 666 et seq.; Nelson, Fixed Prices and the Consumer (1937) 175 EAR-
PER'S MAG. 318, 321; Wolff (1937) 4 TRADE REG. REv. 5. One of the most interesting docu-
ments is the questionnaire the National Association of Retail Druggists sent to its State Fair
Trade Committees to ascertain, among other things, what cooperation was obtained from
other sources in promoting the legislation. See Nat. Ass'n of Retail Druggists Fair Trade
Man. (1937) 33. Local trade advice in Boston is to the effect that within fifty days after the
Massachusetts Act went into effect about 200 of the approximately 68o nationally advertised
products carried by a well stocked drug store were under price maintenance contracts. At a
like date Macy's stated that the price fixing in New York State was fairly complete in the
cosmetic field and over 6o% complete in the drug field. Retail druggists still favor the law.
See Salisbury, Survey of Retail Druggists in Six States (1938) 42 SALES MANAGEMENT
No. 5, 28.
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tributors in some other lines because the association of the business with
pharmaceutical work requiring intellectual minima is a guarantee of some
intelligence. The intellectual element in the mob psychology of trade asso-
ciations operates at such a low level that this suggestion may be admitted
without prejudice for what it may be worth. Drugs have naturally tended
to be branded products. Several simple chemicals, such as carbon tetra-
chloride, are sold at extravagant prices under trade names by reason of the
natural ignorance of the consuming public in matters of chemistry. The
drug business, whether operating as an aid to the physician or as the mere
distributor of quack potions, has always partaken heavily of the mumbo
jumbo of the "medicine-man". There are few lines in which the customer
has less idea of what he is getting and less means of knowing whether he
has had his money's worth when all is said and done. It is a serious ques-
tion whether all branded drug products taken en masse do not net the public
more harm than good. We have the Supreme Court's authority for the
proposition that false advertising of an obesity cure gives rise to no infer-
ence of unfair competition because there is no reason to assume that any
obesity cures are honestly advertised.68 Respectable medical authority has
recently deprecated the popular notion that constipation is per se a serious
menace to health; 64 and, in any event, it has long been an open question
whether proprietary drugs sold in the name of that ailment have not in the
aggregate produced more harm than the ailment itself. A decreasing per-
centage of dentists seems ready to support the myth that there is substantial
virtue in tooth pastes, powders, or mouthwashes. The action of most pro-
prietary disinfectants tends to be either harmful to human tissues or harm-
less to germs. Physiologists have not known whether to be more amused
than disgusted by the claims of advertisers with reference to the effects of
medicine upon the acid-alkaline balance of the body.65 Furthermore, the in-
63. Federal Trade Comm. v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643 (1931).
64. Harold Aaron, M. D., in 1937 wrote eloquently to this effect in a consumer's service
magazine widely distributed on a "confidential" basis.
65. See Henderson, Aphorisms on the Advertising of Alkalies (1937) I6 HARv. Bus.
REv. 17.
"II. The natural defenses of the body against acids and the effects of acids (acidosis)
are exceptionally well known. Like a dog's defenses against heat and cold, they are so
strong and efficient and so prompt in action that the Hippocratic principle applies to them,
if anywhere. In a fairly healthy person and in the vast majority of sick people the
defenses need no reinforcement."
"VI. The belief that colds are cured by the use of alkali should, on the whole, taking
account of all considerations, be classed with the belief that carrying a horse-chestnut in
the pocket wards off disease."
"XIX. . . . If you want some alkali, do as most doctors do, as many of them often
do; go into the kitchen and take a little cooking soda. The price of a hundred-pound bar-
rel is $1.75."
"XXIV.. . . Probably a pretty large part of the American people are born with
the pre-established destiny of becoming hypochondriacs or faddists. If their destiny were
not realized by acquiring a fear of acidosis or a fad for the use of alkalies, it would prob-
ably be more often than not worked out in some similar way. And if their money were
not spent on alkaline drugs, it would perhaps be spent no more profitably on other drugs."
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fluence of self-hypnosis upon health is such that it is frequently impossible
to say whether the addict of advertised drugs who considers himself bene-
fited, has not actually offset physiological damage by psychological regenera-
tion. Probably enough has been said to emphasize that consumer ignorance
tends to render the drug field the happy hunting ground of the "fair trade"
propagandist. An additional circumstance favorable to price maintenance
is the small cost of the majority of the items branded. A consumer will be
moved to chisel his best in connection with the purchase of an automobile
or a radio. 0 He hardly finds it worth while to shop around for a good ten
cent toothbrush, even though he may be inclined to patronize a store having
the reputation of being "cut price". In any event, unless he is unusually
gullible, his annual expenditures for branded drugs will hardly amount to
two per cent of his expenditures for food. The consumer has been referred
to in masculine terms. Regard for the proprieties of the printed page
precludes discussion of the more deadly sex and its abortive quest for
synthetic beauty.
The outstanding fact about "fair trade" legislation is that it swings
the law from one extreme to another. There is no attempt to discriminate
between good price cutting and bad. There is no attempt to start by mitigat-
ing the consequences of violation of the preexisting law. No intermediate
step is taken whereby the rigors of the anti-trust laws are relaxed with refer-
ence to the manufacturer or distributor who endeavors merely to protect
himself against "loss leader" distribution. The Acts do not even stop at
turning what were previously criminal contracts, combinations and con-
spiracies into valid contracts entitled to ordinary legal sanctions. They
proceed to make price maintenance contracts enforceable against persons
who are not parties to them directly or indirectly. The Illinois Act, upheld
in the Seagram case, one of the more moderate Acts, provides that "will-
fully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any commodity
at less than the price stipulated" in a resale price maintenance contract
within the terms of the statute whether the person so-doing "is or is not a
party to such a contract, is hereby declared to constitute unfair competition
and to be actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby". 7 Con-
"XXXII. I know no well-informed person who, unless he is amused by the human
comedy, is not disgusted by the stupidity, the deception, and the misrepresentation that
are manifest in the current advertising of alkalies. And in spite of the dictates of caution
I do think that this disgust, at least, is socially useful."
66. At the same time high-priced merchandise is sometimes better controlled than cheap
lines, through a limited number of distribution outlets. See Wolff (1937) 5 TRADE REG.
REV. 3.
67. Ill. Laws 1935, 1436, 1437, § 2.
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tracts commonly provide for liquidated damages and injunctions.68 In-
junctive relief has been already liberally allowed. 6
The desirability of exploring the "middle ground" was first well de-
veloped by Professor Murchison of the Columbia Faculty of Political
Science in 1919. His theory was that the concepts of cost and of fair
profit should be used as the controlling criteria to differentiate between good
price cutting and bad. Recognizing the practical difficulty of applying such
tests, he suggested thoroughgoing governmental administrative control of
the field. 70 Subsequent experience and subsequent study, notably that of
Professor Grether of the University of California have served to emphasize
that trade co6peration is so essential to compliance that N. R. A. analogies
would have to be followed if prices are to be maintained.7 1  It is a grave
question whether any net public gain in prospect is worth the costs of
68. See "Model Manufacturer-Retailer Contract, suggested form for use in any Fair
Trade State, released by'courtesy of the National Association of Retail Druggists. Final
draft of Oct. 12, 1937"; "Manufacturer-Wholesaler Contract, short form for use under Fed-
eral Tydings-Miller Law and State Fair Trade Laws suitable for use by manufacturer in any
state to stipulate wholesale selling prices in states having Fair Trade Laws. Released by
courtesy of the National Wholesale Druggists Association. Draft of Oct. 22, 1937". 105
C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv., Nov. 23, 1937, 11 1567, 568. The paragraphs numbered seven in
each of the agreements provide for injunctions. See also Wolff (1937) 6 TRADE REG. REV.
19.
69. DeVoin v. Grant Co., lo6 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. 1125,1o6 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1938);
Broff v. Silver Liquor Stores, Inc., io6 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. 125,066 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1937); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Bamberger & Co., 122 N. J. Eq. 559, 195 Atl. 625 (Ch.
1937) (uniform discount to defendant's employees); Houbigant Sales Corp. v. Woods Cut
Rate Store, io6 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. 1 25,o98 (N. J. Ch. 1937); Revlon Nail Enamel
Corp. v. Charmley Drug Shop, 123 N. J. Eq. 301, 197 Atl. 661 (Ch. 1938); Seagram Dis-
tillers Corp. v. Seyopp Corp., xo6 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. 1125,093 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1938) ;
National Distillers Products Corp. v. Columbus Circle Liquor Stores, io6 C. C. H. Trade
Reg. Serv. 7f25,092 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1938); Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor
Store, io6 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. 125,094 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Port Chester, W. &
L. Shops, Inc. v. Miller Bros. Fruiterers, i N. Y. Supp. (2d) 8o2 (App. Div., 2d Dep't,
1938) (competing retailer complainant) ; Schenley Distributors v. Stockman, io6 C. C. H.
Trade Reg. Serv. ff25,IIO (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1938); Segal v. Stockman, io6 C. C. H. Trade
Reg. Serv. ff25,111 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1938) (competing retailer complainant) ; Bristol-Myers
Co. v. Soble, io6 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. 125,114 (Pa. C. P. 1938); Weco Products Co.
v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N. W. 426 (937). In most of the foregoing cases the
defendant was not a party to a contract.
The steam roller has shown signs of bogging down in New York, however, in the demor-
alized fields of razors, radios and liquors. Defendants have shown that complainants were
price cutting or that injunctions would have only capricious operation. Gillette Safety Razor
Co. v. Green, 99 N. Y. L. J. 1559, io6 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. 1 25,117 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. Mar.
30, 1938); Cooper v. Davega-City Radio Corp., N. Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1938, p. 23, col. i
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1938). A preliminary injunction was denied in the Nussbaum case, supra.
See io6 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. 125,087 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1937). See also Schenley Dis-
tributors v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, io6 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. 1125,o86 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 1937). And a New Jersey Chancellor has exercised his discretion to refuse an injunc-
tion where the complainant had refused to sell to defendants on the theory that such refusal
was a failure to "do equity". Lentheric, Inc. v. Weissbard, 122 N. J. Eq. 573, 195 Atl. 818
(Ch. 1937).
The Ohio statute specifically provides for injunctions. Ohio Laws 1936, p. 185, § 4. The
Wyoming Act includes a penalty of a year's imprisonment and $500 fine and a strong pro-
vision for quo warranto against corporations. Wyo. Laws 1937, c. 58, §§ 8, 9.
70. MuacHisoN, op. cit. supra note 49, at 129-140.
71. Grether, supra note 6o, at 332-34.
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administering any elaborate scheme. 72 Elimination of clear cut cases of
"loss leader" selling might be attempted by less extravagant means.
Murchison's balance of interests assumed that resale price maintenance
is definitely superimposed from above by the manufacturer." As we have
seen, recent political history confirms earlier trade advice to the effect that
the greatest pressure for resale price maintenance systems comes not from
the manufacturer, but from the distributors. It is possible to overemphasize
this distinction.74 The proprietor of a trademark may or may not be inter-
ested in building a definite, specific price element into the consumer idea of
his product. So far as he is so interested, he will incline to price mainte-
nance directly on his own account. Private advices from the drug trade,
however, long before the current decade, have portrayed the independent
druggists' associations as pressure groups seeking to induce manufacturers
to promulgate resale price maintenance programs. It is by no means fan-
tastic to postulate the case of a manufacturer driven into "cooperation"
and resale price maintenance by aggressive action of distributors encom-
passing mass diversion of patronage suggestive of the boycott. 75 The truth
concerning many resale price maintenance programs doubtless lies some-
where between such an extreme case and the opposite extreme of the manu-
facturer insisting upon resale price maintenance in his own interests against
the objections of the preponderant opinion of a distributing trade. Most
distributors like the idea of price maintenance. Most of them are not very
learned in theoretical economics nor even particularly astute in gauging the
long time practical effects of a course of conduct.7 6 The limit of their
vision is that price cutting doesn't get one anywhere because it invites re-
prisals with loss to the trade all around. This point of view is particularly
fostered under aggressive trade association leadership that "educates" them
in the virtues of "cooperation" and develops the idea that price cutting in
general is "unethical". A manufacturer naturally wishes to enlist the in-
terest and loyalty of his distributors or at least to minimize friction with
them. If he believes they will appreciate a resale price maintenance pro-
gram, he is likely to consider it good policy to inaugurate one even when
they do not take the initiative in urging such a course.
72. The Wisconsin Act provides for a hearing before the Commissioner of Agriculture
and Markets on the reasonableness of maintained resale prices. Wis. Laws 1935, c. 52, § 7.
73. See supra note 49.
74. Indeed, the perils of overemphasis are prominent in the discussion of the chief con-
troversies here in view. Cf. Grether, supra note 6o, at 331.
75. It was no improbable accident that the Hartnan and Miles cases both involved propri-
etary medicines. Drug cases were the most fruitful source of such litigation. See McLAUGH-
LIN, op. cit. supra note 47, at 469, 470, n. 130, I, B. The aggressiveness of the Canadian drug-
gists evoked an application of anti-trust laws in Canada even before the Hartman case. See
Wampole & Co. v. Karn Co., ii Ont. L. R. 61g (igo6).
76. The inability of business men to learn comparatively simple lessons about the limits
on the effectiveness of combinations in restraint of competition has been forcefully portrayed
by Professor Watkins with particular reference to the paper and corn products industries.
See WATKINS, INDUSTIAL COiBINATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1927) 183, 210.
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The relationship between the doctrine of the federal cases on resale
price maintenance and similar cases which hold horizontal price fixing
agreements to be a violation of the Sherman Act is thus much more intimate
than might be supposed upon the assumption that resale price programs
are imposed from above. Perhaps the most natural of all associated dis-
tributors' activities is the attempt at horizontal price control. With the
strong human pressure in this direction, the impulse finds manifold forms
of expression. Nothing can be more simple than the idea of conscripting
the manufacturers as agents to promulgate and enforce the policies of trade
conspirators.
Furthermore, as N. R. A. experience might suggest and as English
experience virtually demonstrates, 77 strong concerted action by distributors
is a potent and frequently an indispensable element in the enforcement of
price maintenance programs. A legitimate conclusion seems to be (not-
withstanding the fact that the Hartman and the Miles' cases could have
been otherwise decided) that Fair Trade laws are definitely inconsistent
with the theory and spirit of the anti-trust laws. Legislatures may perhaps
be persuaded that, in view of increased concentration in the control of the
methods of production in this country, in view of the growth of mass
distribution, and in view of the concessions made to monopolistic com-
binations by farmers and laborers in recent years, the "independent" dis-
tributors should be allowed to equalize their position with that of the others
by combining to eliminate competition. The consumer answers that all
these combinations seem to be at his expense. An economist may well
answer that, subject to some qualifications which he is ready to discuss in
proper case, the effect of combination is to produce not only imperfections
in the market but lethargy which retards industrial and commercial
progress. 78 Writers believing that free competition is as doomed as laissez-
faire generally insist upon governmental responsibility for the establish-
ment of alternative mechanism for the control of economic activities.79 The
Fair Trade Acts offer no such control. Viewed in their most obvious light
as a direct product of high pressure political lobbying by groups asserting
narrow and unenlightened interests, they present a definite challenge. The
imperfections of a branch of the legal system have been exploited to afford
an occasion for another blow at one of the few traditional safeguards of the
public interest remaining in our present economic society. As a challenge,
they call for an awakened public consciousness and an awakened public
interest.
77. Grether, supra note 6o, at 292-300.
78. WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 76, at 139. Cf. "A huge organization is too clumsy to
take up the development of an original idea." BRANDEIS, THE CURsE OF BIGNESS (1934)
i18.
79. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION (i936) 529; cf. Grether, supra note 6o, at 699.
